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The Popular but Unlawful Armed Reprisal 
MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL 
In the early morning hours of April 6, 2017, United States President 
Donald Trump ordered an unprecedented attack on a Syrian Air Force 
base.1  The U.S. Navy fired fifty-nine Tomahawk Cruise missiles from ships 
in the Mediterranean, reportedly killing nine, including four children, and 
damaging property.2  Trump announced that the attack was a response to the 
Syrian government’s alleged use of chemical weapons days earlier, in which 
seventy-two died.3  Syria denied carrying out the chemical attack, and the 
U.S. offered no public legal justification for its actions. 4  Nevertheless, the 
French and German governments issued a joint press release stating that the 
U.S. attacks were a “just and proportionate” response to the use of chemical 
weapons.5  Indeed, the U.S. attacks were generally met with approval in the 
 
 With thanks for research assistance to Juan P. Albán (JSD candidate), Jonathan McCreary, JD and 
Colin Macarthur, JD. 
 This Article is based on Professor O’Connell’s presentation of the Ohio Northern University Pettit 
College of Law Dean’s Lecture of October 19, 2017. 
 1. Jason Le Miere, Trump’s Attack on Syria Killed Four Children, State News Agency Claims, 
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 7, 2017, 11:10 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/syria-attack-children-civilian-killed-
580555. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Jason Collie & Francesa Gillet, Syria Air Strikes: UK Backs Donald Trump’s Cruise Missile 
Strike in Response to Assad’s Chemical Attack Which Killed 72 Civilians, EVENINGSTANDARD (Apr. 7, 
2017, 5:47 PM), https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/us-launches-cruise-missile-strike-on-syria-
after-chemical-attack-that-killed-72-people-a3509446.html. 
 4. See Sabrina Siddiqui & Lauren Gambino, Are Donald Trump’s Missile Strikes in Syria 
Legal?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2017, 5:26 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/07/donald-
trump-us-missile-strikes-syria-legal. 
 5. Chiara Palazzo & Peter Foster, ‘Assad Bears Full Responsibility’: How the World Reacted to 
Donald Trump’s Missile Strike on Syria, TELEGRAPH (UK) (Apr. 7, 2017, 6:37 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/07/us-air-strike-syria-world-reacted-donald-trumps-decision-
intervene/; see  Aldo Zammit Borda, The Precedent Set by the US Reprisal Against the Use of Chemical 
Weapons in Syria, EJIL: TALK! (May 1, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-precedent-set-by-the-us-
reprisal-against-the-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-syria/comment-page-1/#comment-251292 (suggesting 
that Syria’s use of chemical weapons created extenuating circumstances mitigating otherwise unlawful 
action). 
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West.6  In the U.S., they were among President Trump’s most popular 
actions in his first year in office. 7 
On June 18, 2017, Iran launched missiles into eastern Syria targeting a 
town held by ISIS forces following violence on June 7 at Iran’s parliament 
and a shrine in Tehran that left at least eighteen dead and more than fifty 
wounded.8  ISIS claimed responsibility for the incident.9  Iran’s government 
stated its aim in attacking was “to punish the terrorists for the twin attacks 
on the Iranian parliament and the holy shrine of the late founder of the 
Islamic Republic, Imam Khomeini . . . .”10  Iran also threatened to retaliate 
in the same way in the future if provoked.11  It was the first time in thirty 
years that Iran had fired missiles outside its territory, and while it is true that 
Iran has been assisting the government of Bashar al Assad in the civil war in 
Syria, the purpose of the June 18 attacks was retaliation.12  Iran’s Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “vowed Iran would slap its enemies.”13  
Concern about Iran’s use of missiles was voiced by several states.14  The 
criticism did not specify that Iran had violated international law.15 
On April 14, 2018,  France, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
fired over 100 missiles at three sites in Syria.16  Syria reported property 
damage but no casualties as a direct result of the action. The strikes 
followed one week after reports that the Syrian government had again used 
 
 6. E.A. Crunden & Esther Yu Hsi Lee, International Leaders Weigh in on U.S. Strike in Syria, 
THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 7, 2017, 3:33 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/international-response-to-syria-
strike-1bd28add73c3/. 
 7. Glenn Greenwald, Spoils of War: Trump Lavished with Media and Bipartisan Praise for 
Bombing Syria, THE INTERCEPT (Apr. 7, 2017, 10:43 AM), https://theintercept.com/2017/04/07/the-
spoils-of-war-trump-lavished-with-media-and-bipartisan-praise-for-bombing-syria/. 
 8. Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Iran Targets ‘Terrorists’ in Missile Strike on Isis-held Syrian Town, 
GUARDIAN (June 18, 2017, 6:25 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/18/iran-targets-
terrorists-in-missile-strike-on-isis-held-syrian-town.  ‘ISIS’ is an acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria, a group also known by the acronym ‘ISIL’, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. See ALI 
SOUFAN, ANATOMY OF TERROR: FROM THE DEATH OF BIN LADEN TO THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 
xvi (2017).  Increasingly, the group is known as “Daesh,” the Arabic form of the acronym.  ISIS is an 
offshoot of the terrorist organization, Al Qaeda.  The two groups separated, and ISIS has been 
denounced by the main Al Qaeda organization. See id. 
 9. Dehghan, supra note 8. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Iran Fires Missiles at ISIL Positions in Eastern Syria, ALJAZEERA (June 18, 2017), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/iran-fires-missiles-isil-positions-eastern-syria-
170618193251349.html. 
 12. Id.; Dehghan, supra note 8. 
 13. Iran Fires Missiles at ISIL Positions in Eastern Syria, supra note 11. 
 14. See Mehdi Jedinia, Iran Escalates Involvement in Syria with Anti-IS Missile Strike, VOA 
(June 21, 2017, 4:45 PM), https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-escalates-involvement-in-
syria/3910361.html. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Helene Cooper, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Ben Hubbard, U.S., Britain, and France Strike Over 
Suspected Chemical Weapons Attack, NEW YORK TIMES, April 13, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/trump-strikes-syria-attack.html. 
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chemical weapons in opposition areas. Only the United Kingdom attempted 
to cite a legal basis for the resort to force. Prime Minister Theresa May’s 
office issued a statement saying the missile attacks were justified as 
“humanitarian intervention . . .”17  After the action, at a debate at the UN, 
U.S. representative Nikki Haley, merely said it was “justified, legitimate, 
and proportionate” without any attempt to provide the legal basis for finding 
it justified.  The French UN representative said the attacks were a response 
to the Syrian regime’s unlawful use of chemical weapons.  He did not 
answer the Bolivian representative’s question, asking why it was lawful to 
violate the prohibition on force to respond to the unlawful use of chemical 
weapons.18 
Despite the express and implied support for the attacks on Syria on all 
three dates, retaliatory attacks are clearly prohibited by international law.19  
International law generally prohibits the use of force except in self-defense, 
with the UN Security Council’s authorization, or in some cases with the 
invitation of a government.20  Retaliation or reprisals are after-the-fact 
responses that do not fit the exception for self-defense and would thus need 
Security Council authorization or an invitation to join in a lawful use of 
force by, in this case, Syria’s government.21  Prior to the Trump 
administration, the U.S. consistently attempted to justify retaliatory uses of 
force as by characterizing the facts to fit the self-defense or invitation 
 
 17. ‘Syria Action – UK Government Legal Position’, 14 April 2018, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position/syria-action-uk-
government-legal-position. 
 18. Sewell Chan, U.N. Security Council Rejects Russian Resolution Condemning Syria Strikes, 
N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/14/world/middleeast/un-security-
council-syria-airstrikes.html. 
 19. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.  “Few propositions about international law have enjoyed more 
support than the proposition that, under the Charter of the United Nations, the use of force by way of 
reprisals is illegal.”  Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 
(1972).  Bowett supports this conclusion by spending most of the article attempting to create a new 
justification for resort to reprisals.  See, e.g., id. at 26-28. For an author who shares Bowett’s interest in 
seeing a new exception to permit reprisals, see, William O’Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-
Defense in Counterterror Operations, 30 VIRGINIA J. INT’L L. 421 (1990).  For a thorough rejection of 
these arguments in favor of legalizing reprisals, see, Roberto Barsotti, Armed Reprisals, in CURRENT 
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE (A. Cassese ed., 1986).  By 2018, Gray found the law 
against reprisals unchanged.  CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, 160, 
162, and 205 (2018). 
 20. Shane Darcy, Retaliation and Reprisal, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 879 (Marc Weller et al., eds., 2015). 
 21. Id. at 881.  Darcy provides a definition but one that relies on a term with no legal definition, 
war: “Such reprisals . . .  can be considered as acts of forcible self-help, involving an unlawful use of 
force falling short of war, by one state in response to a prior violation of international law by another. 
‘Armed reprisals’ is the most suitable label for such actions.” Id.  Darcy goes on to note that Antonio 
Cassese considered reprisals to be “‘aimed at either impelling the delinquent state to discontinue the 
wrongdoing, or at punishing it, or both.’” Id. at 882 (quoting ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
299 (2005)). 
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paradigms.22  While those arguments generally fell short,23 they at least 
recognized the law, unlike the decision to offer no legal justification 
following either the April 2018 or April 2017 attacks.24 
The implications of these latest violations of international law on the 
use of force for the world are grave.25  Human lives have been taken 
through missile attacks amidst indications of declining knowledge and 
respect for the law.26  Such disrespect has repercussions.27  The U.S., 
France, the UK, and Iran want ISIS to comply with human rights and to 
denounce terrorism and violence of all kinds, yet, such demands lack 
credibility when those issuing them do not themselves comply with 
international law’s most important rules.28  Moreover, disrespect for the law 
in one area can weaken the system as a whole, a system that extends from 
the principle of non-intervention to regulation of cyber space.29 
One thesis of this article is that disrespect for the prohibition on 
reprisals is owing in part to lack of knowledge respecting what the law 
actually requires.30  The first part of the discussion provides a brief 
overview of the law relevant to the use of force in general and armed 
reprisals in particular.31  The second part focuses on past U.S. attempts to fit 
armed reprisals into the self-defense exception.32  The article concludes that 
these past attempts weakened respect for the law, paving the way for the 
American and Iranian attacks in Syria and the muted world reaction to 
them.33  Despite any short-term gratification the attacks brought, long term 
they undermine the interest in avoiding a lawless world that both the U.S. 
and Iran seem to desire.34  Former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in 
 
 22. See, e.g., Micah Zenko, How the Obama Administration Justifies Targeted Killings, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN REL. (July 5, 2012), https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-obama-administration-justifies-targeted-
killings. 
 23. Amanda Taub, Experts: Obama’s Legal Justification for the War on ISIS is “a Stretch”, 
VOX (Sept., 12, 2014, 8:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/iraq-crisis/2014/9/12/6134159/is-obamas-new-
isis-strategy-legal. 
 24. Siddiqui, supra note 4. 
 25. Jan Lemnitzer, Is Trump’s Strike in Syria Changing International Law?, CONVERSATION 
(Apr. 11, 2017, 10:46 PM), http://theconversation.com/is-trumps-strike-in-syria-changing-international-
law-76073. 
 26. Miere, supra note 1. 
 27. Lemnitzer, supra note 25. 
 28. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html (last 
visited May 29, 2018). 
 29. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Brandeis stated, “If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt 
for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself”.). 
 30. See infra The Prohibition on the Use of Force, notes 37-117 and accompanying text. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See infra The Prohibition on Armed Reprisals, notes 118-249 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra Conclusion, notes 250-257 and accompanying text. 
 34. Lemnitzer, supra note 25. 
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October 2017, demanded that China, for example, adhere to the world’s 
“rules-based order.”35  All rules-based systems begin with the prohibition on 
the unauthorized use of force.36 
THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE 
Following centuries of evolution to which political leaders, scholars, 
popular movements, religious leaders, and others contributed, most 
sovereign states in the world agreed to a treaty rule in 1945 that generally 
prohibits the use of force.37  The rule is at the heart of the United Nations 
Charter, a multilateral treaty that established the United Nations 
organization and set rules and principles for member states.38  The first line 
of the Charter provides the UN’s purpose: “We the peoples of the United 
Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war 
. . . .” agree to be bound by the terms of the Charter.39  Chapter I, Article 
1(1) further emphasizes the purpose of the UN and the principles the 
organization seeks to foster: 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to 
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of 
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or 
other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, 
and in conformity with the principles of justice and international 
law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations 
which might lead to a breach of the peace[.]40 
Article 2(4) specifically prohibits resort to force by states: “All members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”41  
The Charter’s drafters intended Chapter I, Article 2(4) to be a general 
prohibition on the use of force, a fact that becomes evident when it is read 
in the context of the Charter as a whole and its negotiating history.42  
Chapter VI of the Charter mandates that disputes be settled peacefully.43  
Chapter VII provides the only two express Charter-based exceptions to  
 35. Nicole Gaouette, Tillerson Raps China as ‘Predatory’ Rule Breaker, CNN (Oct. 19, 2017, 
2:34 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/18/politics/tillerson-china-rebuke-speech/index.html. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 38. See generally, U.N. Charter. 
 39. Id. pmbl. 
 40. Id. art. 1 ¶ 1. 
 41. Id. art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 42. Edward Gordon, Article 2(4) in Historical Context, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 271, 278 (1985). 
 43. U.N. Charter art. 33, ¶ 1. 
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Article 2(4).44  Articles 39–42 enumerate the powers of the UN Security 
Council to authorize force for the purpose of restoring international peace 
and security.45  Chapter VII, Article 51 permits the use of force in individual 
and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs, until the Security 
Council acts.46  The Charter also promotes human rights and economic 
development to mitigate some of the well-known causes of conflict.47  
Chapter XV, Article 99 authorizes the UN Secretary General to bring any 
matter that may threaten international peace and security to the attention of 
the Security Council.48 
U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt commissioned the drafting of the 
Charter in 1939.49  The U.S. also organized the final negotiating session in 
San Francisco in 1945.50  The records from San Francisco confirm that the 
drafters intended Article 2(4) to be a comprehensive ban on the use of 
force.51  A member of the U.S. delegation in responding to a question by the 
Brazilian delegation on the scope of Article 2(4) said, the authors of the 
original text intended “to state in the broadest terms an absolute all-
inclusive prohibition; the phrase ‘or in any other manner’ was designed to 
insure that there should be no loopholes.”52  The negotiating history also 
confirms that Article 2(4) covers the use of armed force in distinction to 
more general forceful or coercive measures not involving the use of force, 
such as economic sanctions, 53 cyber-attacks, or minimal uses of force such 
as those involved in law enforcement. 54 
The broad prohibition on resort to force in Article 2(4) was paired with 
only one exception in the original draft, force authorized by the Security 
Council.55  The Council must first consider measures short of force.56  If 
these are found inadequate, measures involving armed force may be used to 
 
 44. Id. arts. 39-42, 51. 
 45. Id. arts. 39-42. 
 46. Id. art. 51. 
 47. Id. art. 1, ¶ 3. 
 48. U.N. Charter art. 99. 
 49. See STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 
A STORY OF SUPERPOWERS, SECRET AGENTS, WARTIME ALLIES AND ENEMIES, AND THEIR QUEST FOR A 
PEACEFUL WORLD 33-34 (2003). 
 50. Id. at 34, 111. 
 51. U.N. Conference on International Organization, E/F.752/24 (June 4, 1945). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. (discussing the rejection of a proposal by Brazil to extend the prohibition on force to 
economic coercion). 
 54. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Prohibition of the use of Force, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW: JUS AD BELLUM, JUS IN BELLO, AND JUS POST BELLUM 
107 (Nigel D. White & Christian Henderson, eds., 2013); but see Thomas Ruys, The Meaning of Force 
and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are Minimal Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 
2(4)?, 108 AM. J. 159, 163 (2014). 
 55. U.N. Charter art. 42. 
 56. Id. arts. 40-41. 
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re-establish international peace.57  Latin American states at San Francisco 
became concerned that their proposed treaty for collective self-defense 
might conflict with the Article 2(4)/Security Council regime in the 
Charter.58  Article 2(4) could be construed as requiring a state to get 
Security Council authorization prior to assisting another state that had been 
attacked in violation of Article 2(4), so59 the Latin American States 
requested an additional exception.60  In response, the U.S. delegation drafted 
a new, narrow provision permitting self-defense and collective self-defense 
in an emergency case where an “armed attack occurs” until the Security 
Council acts.61  The new provision became Article 51.62 
The U.S. delegation discussed the possibility of allowing resort to self-
defense in anticipation of an armed attack.63  This however was rejected.64  
One member of the delegation, Senator Harold Stassen, explained: “We did 
not want exercised the right of self-defense before an armed attack had 
occurred.”65  Indeed, only a narrow right of self-defense would be consistent 
with other provisions of the Charter.66  In addition to the general prohibition 
on force in Article 2(4), the provisions of Chapter VII and Chapter VIII 
giving the Security Council principal authority over peace and security 
made sense only in the case of a narrow exception for the use of force by 
States acting independently of the Council.67 
 
 57. Id. arts. 39, 42. 
 58. See RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER (1958), 695-696; see 
also, George K. Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era: What the Treaties 
Have Said, 31 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 321, 351 (1998). 
 59. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 60. In 1947 parties to the Rio Treaty provided in Article 3: “The High Contracting Parties agree 
that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all 
the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in 
meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized 
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.”  Rio Treaty, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance, Rio-U.S., art. 3, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681. 
 61. Walker, supra note 58, at 351-53. 
 62. Id. at 351. 
 63. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: The United 
Nations, Volume I, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v01 (last visited Apr. 18, 2018). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Bert V. A. Röling, The Ban on the Use of Force and the U.N. Charter, in THE CURRENT 
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE, pp. 4-5 (A. Cassese ed., 1986).  (“[M]ost commentators 
begin the process of exegesis with Art. 2(4), in deference to the paramount concern of the Charter with 
the maintenance of ‘international peace and security.’  It then becomes desirable to interpret the word 
“force” in Art. 2(4) at least widely enough to ensure that any significant use of military force is banned; 
and to give the acknowledged exception created by Art. 51 a correspondingly narrow meaning.”); see 
also, Dominika Švarc, Redefining Imminence: The Use of Force Against Threats and Armed Attacks in 
the Twenty-First Century, 13 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 171, 175, 177 (2006). 
 67. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 52, ¶ 3, 53 ¶ 1. 
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Requiring an armed attack placed an important control on a use of force 
that had not been authorized by the Security Council.68  The defending state 
is in a position to point to open, public evidence of the need to respond with 
force.69  Other, less tangible or immediate threats must be submitted to the 
collective scrutiny of the Security Council.70  The design relies on collective 
deliberation of the Council as a better process for determining threats to the 
peace than would be case of the unilateral decision of the potential victim.71 
States claim one additional basis for resort to force relevant to this 
discussion, invitation or consent.72  Iran accepted the Syrian government’s 
invitation to assist in suppressing the dozens of armed militias challenging 
it, including ISIS.73  Invitation does not appear in the Charter and on its face 
conflicts with Article 2(4), but the practice is common.74  States have on 
dozens of occasions since 1945, cited a right to assist governments in 
suppressing internal armed rebellion.75  The International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) has considered cases on the question of illegal use of force that also 
featured invitations.76  The court has not taken up the legality of invitations 
in any detail.  It clearly implies, however, in Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (Armed Activities) and Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua) v. United States that 
invitation is a lawful basis for the use of force abroad when the invitation is 
issued by a government in control of most of the state or at least fighting 
with a likelihood of success in maintaining control against armed non-state 
actors seeking to oust it.77 
 
 68. Švarc, supra note 66, at 171, 177. 
 69. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 70. Id. art. 39. 
 71. Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Arc toward Justice and Peace, in ARCS OF GLOBAL JUSTICE: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WILLIAM A. SCHABAS 469 (Margaret M. deGuzman & Diane Marie Amann, 
eds., 2018). 
 72. Max Byrne, Consent and the Use of Force: An Examination of ‘Intervention by Invitation’ as 
a Basis for US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, Somalia & Yemen, 3 J. ON USE FORCE & INT’L L. 97, 98 
(2016). 
 73. Iran’s Presence in Syria on Syrians’ Invitation, MEHR NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 14, 2018, 4:41 
PM),  
https://en.mehrnews.com/news/132159/Iran-s-presence-in-Syria-on-Syrians-invitation. 
 74. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 75. Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the 
Government, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 189, 189 (1986). 
 76. E.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, 2005 ICJ Rep. 168, 194 (Dec. 19); Christian Marxsen, The Crimea Crisis: An International 
Law Perspective, 74 ZaöRV 367, 372 (2014). 
 77. Armed Activities, 2005 ICJ Rep. at 212; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, Merits, 1986 ICJ Rep. 25, 78 (June 27).  The right to issue an 
invitation to join in collective self-defense to an armed attack from a foreign State is expressly provided 
for in UN Charter Article 51.  See Doswald-Beck, supra note 75, at 213, 221; Marxsen, supra note 76, at 
375-77; see generally BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 284 
(1999). 
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In Armed Activities, the ICJ also found that withdrawing consent 
requires no formal, express evidence; indirect indications suffice.78  That 
finding is consistent with the position that a high bar exists to the lawful 
exercise of armed force by a state on another state’s territory under a 
justification of invitation or consent.79  Indirect and even ambiguous 
evidence that consent has been withdrawn is sufficient to end it.80  Syria 
plainly wants Iran’s assistance, so if Iran had attacked ISIS as part of its 
effort at ending the organization’s hold on Syria, the attacks would arguably 
have been lawful.81  The announcement that the purpose of the June 2017 
missile strikes was revenge for ISIS terrorism raises questions of their 
legality.82  The fact that the missile strikes involved a far greater quantity of 
force further distinguishes the attacks from the assistance offered with 
Syria’s consent.83  Even if Syria gave its consent, as will be discussed 
below, it could not authorize a use of military force for punishment or 
revenge.84 
The ICJ has ruled on other aspects of the use of force beyond 
invitation.85  In the Nicaragua case, it  held that an armed attack triggering 
the right of self-defense must be significant—it must be more than a mere 
frontier incident.86  The court found the additional obligations to limit the 
use of force in the term “inherent right” (“droit natural” in the French 
version)  of UN Charter Article 51 as a reference to additional, restrictive 
principles found in international law outside the Charter.87  Among the 
important rules of general international law are the general principles of 
necessity, proportionality, and attribution. 88  Necessity requires that any use 
of force in self-defense be undertaken only as a last resort and where there 
is a high likelihood that using military force will succeed in accomplishing 
 
 78. Armed Activities, 2005 ICJ Rep. at 197. 
 79. Id. at 194-95 (stating that Uganda claimed that in response to a threat by the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and the Sudan, it exercised its sovereign right of self-defense to augment its 
forces in eastern Congo). 
 80. Id. at 198 (stating that no particular formalities were required for the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo to withdraw its consent to the presence of Ugandan troops on its soil). 
 81. See David W. Lesch, Iran Is Taking Over Syria. Can Anyone Stop It?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/29/opinion/iran-syria.html. 
 82. See Iran Fires Missiles at ISIL Positions in Eastern Syria, supra note 11. 
 83. Syria Crisis: Where Key Countries Stand, BBC (Oct. 30, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587 (stating that Iran was believed to have spent 
billions of dollars to support President Assad, provide military advisors, and to subsidize weapons, lines 
of credit, and oil transfers). 
 84. Michael Wood, International Law and the Use of Force: What Happens in Practice?, 53 
INDIAN J. INT’L L. 345, 352 (2013). 
 85. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. at 103 (discussing the right of self-defense in cases of armed 
attack which has already occurred). 
 86. Id. at 103-04. 
 87. Id. at 93. 
 88. Id. at 94, 65. 
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the legitimate objective of defense.89  Proportionality requires that even 
when the requirements of necessity are met, military force must not impose 
a disproportionate cost on the state responsible for the armed attack 
compared with the injury to the defending state. 90  Attribution requires that 
force may only be used on the territory of a foreign sovereign state where 
the government of that state is responsible for the wrongful armed attack.  
Some scholars have attempted to assert that attacking a single individual or 
armed group found on the territory of a state is somehow different than 
attacking the state itself.  That is an erroneous characterization under the 
law of state responsibility and the right of territorial integrity.  A state may 
not be attacked because of the presence of armed terrorist organizations 
uncontrolled by the state.91  The territorial state may have failed to exercise 
due diligence with respect to controlling non-state actors.92  Failure of due 
diligence, however, does not give rise to the right to use force in self-
defense.93 
The prohibition on the use of force is today discerned as more than 
mere treaty law or even customary international law.  It is widely 
categorized as jus cogens or a peremptory norm.94  Peremptory norms are 
the international community’s highest ethical principles.  They are 
consistent with ancient and universal moral principles.  No derogation from 
these norms is permitted through the operation of standard treaty and 
customary international law processes for creation and modification of 
rules.  No derogation is permitted by, for example, expanding exceptions.  
Peremptory norms can always reach more conduct, never less.  This point is 
easy to grasp when other jus cogens norms are considered.  In addition to 
the prohibition on the use of force, genocide, slavery, torture, and apartheid 
are prohibited.95  The logic of jus cogens mandates that these prohibitions  
 89. Oil Platforms (Iran v U.S.), Judgment, 2003 ICJ Rep. 161, 198 (Nov. 6). (stating that the 
conditions for the exercise of the right of self-defense are well-settled and require that self-defense 
warrants only measures which are proportional to the armed attacked and necessary to respond to it). 
 90. Id. at 198-199.  For more on proportionality, see Georg Nolte, Multipurpose Self-Defence, 
Proportionality Disoriented: A Response to David Kretzmer, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 283 (2013). 
 91. Armed Activities, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. at 222-23, 268 (noting that while Uganda claimed to have 
acted in self-defense, it never claimed that it had been subjected to an armed attack by Congo.  The 
series of attacks on Uganda were not attributable to Congo on the evidence.); see also James Gathii, 
Irregular Forces and Self-defense Under the UN Charter, in 37 INT’L HUMANITARIAN L.: WHAT IS 
WAR? AN INVESTIGATION IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 97, 97 (Mary Ellen O’Connell ed., 2012) (arguing that 
expanding the right of self-defense to include attacks by irregular forces whose conduct is not 
attributable to a State would be inconsistent with earlier Security Council criticisms of self-defense.) 
 92. Armed Activities, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. at 231 (stating that Uganda would be responsible for any 
lack of vigilance in preventing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by other 
actors present in the occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on their own account). 
 93. See Gathii, supra note 91. 
 94. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. at 100. 
 95. Jan Wouters; Sten Verhoeven, The Prohibition of Genocide as a Norm of Jus Cogens and its 
Implications for the Enforcement of the Law of Genocide, 5 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 401, 404 (2005); Erika 
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can never be narrowed as that would result in derogation.  Slavery, for 
example, was once thought to involve only cases where one person 
purported to legally own another.96  The international community now 
discerns that slavery exists in a broader set of circumstances.There is de 
facto slavery, not just de jure. 
The prohibition on the use of force plainly belongs in this small set of 
extraordinary legal norms.  Historians of the international law on the use of 
force commonly trace the prohibition on force to the teaching of St. 
Augustine, a fifth century North African bishop.  Augustine sought to move 
his congregation away from the strict pacifism being practiced by many 
early Christians, drawing on Greek and Roman philosophy and law 
justifying resort to war to achieve peace.97  Peace was also among the 
highest Christian values, so Augustine reasoned that peace could be a just 
cause of war for Christians.98  He concluded that using limited war when 
necessary as “a means of preserving or restoring peace” could be acceptable 
to Christians desiring to conform their conduct to their religious belief.99  In 
addition to self-defense, Augustine considered it just to fight to restore what 
was stolen, to respond to wrongdoing in an attempt to prevent future 
wrongs, as well as to promote Christianity.100 
Through the centuries, it became clear that Augustine’s concept of “just 
war” could be read flexibly.101  Christians began fighting not just in 
situations of extremis but to promote the Church or a king.102  Fighting in 
the Crusades or fighting to conquer and colonize all became justified under 
 
de Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and its Implications for 
National and Customary Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 97, 97-98 (2004); M. Cherif Bassiouni, International 
Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68, 72 n.46 (1996). 
 96. Jean Allain, The Definition of Slavery in International Law, 52 HOW. L. J. 239, 240 (2009) 
(stating that the League of Nations Slavery Convention of 1926 defined slavery as “the status or 
condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are 
exercised.”). 
 97. WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (Michael Byers, trans. & 
rev., 2000) (Latin re-phrasing omitted) (stating Augustine’s teaching transformed Antiquity’s 
conceptions of just war, based primarily on Cicero’s work, and that it was concerned with the restoration 
of peace). 
 98. Joachim von Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law, 33 
AM. J. INT’L L. 665, 669-70 (1939) (stating that the teachings of the numerous canonists who elaborated 
the doctrine of the just war align with the principles laid down by the Fathers of the Church, particularly 
in their emphasis that one of the principal conditions of the justness of war was the restoration of peace). 
 99. GREWE, supra note 97, at 107. 
 100. von Elbe, supra note 98, at 667 (stating that the Christian concept of the just war furnishes 
rules for limiting and guarding it in accordance with the precepts of the new religion); GREWE, supra 
note 97, at 106-07 (Latin re-rephrasing omitted). 
 101. Geoffrey Parker, Early Modern Europe, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE 
IN THE WESTERN WORLD 40, 43 (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994) (stating that many European 
statesmen proclaimed with pride that they fought principally to advance the cause of their church and 
that King Phillip was accused by the pope of wishing to attack England solely for political reasons). 
 102. Id. at 43. 
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the argument that once all the world converted to Christianity, peace would 
prevail and all fighting would end.103  Christian warriors succeeded in 
establishing the Holy Roman Empire that lasted from the crowning of 
Charlemagne in 800 to the end of the Thirty Years’ War with the signing of 
the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. 104 
During this long period, scholars continued to grapple with the linked 
issues of the morality and legality of war.105  In the Middle Ages, St. 
Thomas Aquinas systematized Augustine’s work, giving it a law-like 
form.106  From his writing, the restrictive approach to war was adopted into 
international law as this legal system took its modern form in response to 
the Protestant Reformation.107  Resort to war required a just cause as the 
fundamental pre-requisite, such as self-defense.  Lawful war was always a 
last resort that had to have a prospect of succeeding and would not cause 
disproportionate injury.108 
The Reformation and the Scientific Revolution both heavily impacted 
law, suppressing resort to religious teaching. 109  Law was increasingly 
considered to require positive, material proof of its rules.  Legislation, 
treaties, and rules of common law or customary law fit the requirement but 
not higher ethical norms, such as the prohibition on resort to force.  
Nevertheless, the principles of the just war persisted.  In many accounts of 
the nineteenth century, scholars tend to conclude that the rise of positivism 
meant the end of legal restraint on force.  The record shows, however, that 
government officials and legal scholars in Europe, as well as North and 
South America continued to recognize the Just War Doctrine.  Few 
European governments ever failed to offer justifications in terms of some 
just or lawful cause. 
With the suppression of religious teaching, new explanations were 
needed for the understanding that law is binding.  Most legal systems, 
 
 103. ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 20 (2d ed. 1954) 
(stating that part of the Church’s crusade legislation was partly intended to expand ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction over the estates of the crusaders). 
 104. Id. at 115 (stating that the Thirty Years’ War was ended by the Peace of Westphalia after 
negotiations had dragged on for more than three years). 
 105. Charles J. Reid, Jr., John T. Noonan, Jr., on the Catholic Conscience and War: Negre v. 
Larsen, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 881, 882 (2001) (stating that throughout its long history, Catholic just-
war theory has required believers to examine the morality of state decisions in favor of war). 
 106. von Elbe, supra note 98, at 669-70. 
 107. Michael Walzer, The Triumph of Just War (and the Dangers of Success), 69 SOC. RES. 925, 
926-27 (stating that world rulers embraced the theory of just war and writers Grotius and Pufendorf 
incorporated just war theory into international law). 
 108. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 555-56 (2d ed. 1997). 
 109. See e.g. Martyn Shuttleworth, Science and the Enlightenment, EXPLORABLE, 
https://explorable.com/science-and-enlightenment (last visited Apr. 18, 2018); See John Witte, Jr., The 
Legacy of the Protestant Reformation in Modern Law, POL. THEORY NETWORK (Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://politicaltheology.com/the-legacy-of-the-protestant-reformation-in-modern-law/. 
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including international law, began on the basis that God requires obedience 
to law.  In international law, this divine command concept was part of a 
sophisticated theory known as natural law.  As the scientific revolution 
impacted European thinkers, they looked to material evidence to support 
reasoning of all kinds.  By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
international law scholars argued strenuously for material or positive 
evidence of the law.  They wanted to see consent to treaties or rules of 
customary international law.  They had no time for ideas incorporating 
acceptance, beauty, belief, or any other extra-positive source.  Despite 
crusading efforts by proponents of “legal science”, however, natural law 
never disappeared.110  Indeed, in recent years, new interest has emerged in 
understanding the place of natural law in the international legal system.111 
Interestingly, the natural law doctrine of restricted war continued to be 
espoused even by some pure positivists.112  The Austrian, Hans Kelsen, said 
to be the greatest legal mind of the twentieth century by Harvard Law 
School’s mid-century dean, Dean Roscoe Pound, lent his considerable talent 
to the legal problem of war. He wrote that the contemporary Just War 
Doctrine was found in the treaties restricting war, including the Treaty of 
Versailles of 1919, the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the 1945 United 
Nations Charter.  Kelsen cited Augustine, Aquinas, and Grotius as the 
original authors of the prohibition, a moral and legal norm of jus cogens.113 
Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Australia, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan instituted a 
thorough review of the UN Charter rules on the use of force.114  He 
determined the review was necessary following criticisms of his conclusion 
that the three states had violated Article 2(4).  Two years later, UN members 
reaffirmed Article 2(4) during the 2005 United Nations World Summit in 
New York.115  The World Summit Outcome document contains these 
provisions: 
 
 110. See generally 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 86-87 (1905) (demonstrating that 
natural law is still in existence). 
 111. See, e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Diss. Op. Cançado Trindade), Judgment, 
2012 I.C.J. 86, at 97, 99, 165, 167 (Feb. 3) (especially his dissenting opinion in Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening)). 
 112. Hendrik Simon, The Myth of Liberum Ius Ad Bellum: Justifying War in 19th Century Legal 
Theory and Political Practice, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 113-136  (2018). 
 113. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 330 (Anders Wedberg trans. 
1945, reprinted 1999, 2011). See also, Mary Ellen O’Connell, Peace and War, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 290 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 
2012). 
 114. Lessons of Iraq War Underscore Importance of UN Charter – Annan, UN NEWS (Sept. 16, 
2004) https://news.un.org/en/story/2004/09/115352-lessons-iraq-war-underscore-importance-un-charter-
annan. 
 115. G.A. Res. 60/1, at ¶¶ 78-79 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
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78. We reiterate the importance of promoting and strengthening the 
multilateral process and of addressing international challenges and 
problems by strictly abiding by the Charter and the principles of 
international law, and further stress our commitment to 
multilateralism.116 
79. We reaffirm that the relevant provisions of the Charter are 
sufficient to address the full range of threats to international peace 
and security.  We further reaffirm the authority of the Security 
Council to mandate coercive action to maintain and restore 
international peace and security.  We stress the importance of acting 
in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.117 
THE PROHIBITION ON ARMED REPRISALS 
A long-standing interpretation of the UN Charter principles on the use 
of force is that armed reprisals are unlawful.118  Armed reprisals do not fit 
the Article 51 exception for the use of force and would, therefore, require 
Security Council authorization.119  The Security Council has never 
authorized a reprisal.  Arguments asserting that reprisals were once 
unlawful—but are no longer due to evolving state practice or new 
interpretations—must fail.  Such arguments overlook that the prohibition on 
reprisals is part of the jus cogens prohibition on the use of force permitting 
no derogation. 
Prior to the adoption of the Charter, limited evidence suggests that 
measures short of war, such as reprisals, were regulated under different 
principles than the Just War Doctrine.120  Regardless, armed reprisals were 
subject to a restrictive legal regime throughout the history of international 
law.121  Armed reprisals were lawful only if in response to a prior wrong.122  
Other restrictions applied as well.123  This law is well known, thanks in part 
to a 1928 arbitral award in the Naulilaa case between Portugal and 
 
 116. Id. at ¶ 78. 
 117. Id. at ¶ 79. 
 118. Id. at ¶ 77. 
 119. U.N. Charter art. 51, ¶ 1 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence [sic] if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations . . . .”). 
 120. O’Connell, supra note 113, at 278.  One such principle is the sovereignty doctrine in which 
the decision of whether to enter into war was left to the decision of the individual leader of the state.  
States were encouraged to use various means of peaceful settlement instead of resorting to war. See id. 
 121. U.N. Charter art. 51, ¶ 1. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See generally Arbitration Award (Port. v. Ger.), 2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1011 (1949) 
(emphasizing the other restrictions that are applicable). 
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Germany.124  The case was heard by a tribunal established under the Treaty 
of Versailles and involved events on the eve of the First World War.125  In 
1914, German and Portuguese troops met on the border of their neighboring 
colonies, today Namibia and Angola.126  Owing to a misunderstanding—
perhaps due to poor translation—the Portuguese killed three German 
officers.127  Germany responded with retaliatory attacks against several 
Portuguese outposts.128  Portugal claimed these attacks violated 
international law.129  The tribunal agreed, finding Germany failed to meet 
the three conditions of lawful reprisals; first, Portugal had committed no 
prior wrong.130  Even if it had committed a prior wrong, Germany was 
required to give notice of the wrong and demand a remedy, attempting to 
resolve the dispute peacefully.131  If the attempt failed, Germany’s response 
had to be proportional to the wrong.132  Again, it was not proportional.133 
With the adoption of the Charter in 1945, these rules regarding reprisals 
became applicable only to coercive measures not involving the use of armed 
force, known today as counter-measures.134  In the Air Services Arbitration 
of 1978 between the United States and France, the arbitrators used the term 
“countermeasure” when referring to a wrong committed by the U.S. against 
France that was justifiable owing to the prior wrong committed by 
France.135  The U.S. had fulfilled the other elements of the Naulilaa formula 
as well.136  The U.S. notified France of its view a wrong had been 
committed and of the need for a remedy.137  The countermeasures instituted 
subsequent to the notice were found proportional to the wrong.138 
The UN International Law Commission confirmed the Air Services 
tribunal’s analysis in its Articles on State Responsibility, which was 
concluded in 2001 through the acceptance by the General Assembly.139  The 
 
 124. State Responsibility, 2 U.N.Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 125,136 (1964) (holding that “no 
violation of international law had occurred on the part of Portugal justifying the German reprisal. [Thus,] 
[t]he reprisal was [a] breach of international law . . . .”). 
 125. Julia Pfeil, Naulilaa Arbitration (Portugal v. Germany), in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007). 
 126. State Responsibility, supra note 124, at 137. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Port. v. Ger., 2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards. 
 129. State Responsibility, supra note 124, at 137. 
 130. Pfeil, supra note 125. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Port. v. Ger., 2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards. 
 134. Air Services Agreement (U.S. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1978 I.C.J. 417, 427 (Dec. 9). 
 135. Id. at 443. 
 136. Id. at 443-44. 
 137. Id. at 446. 
 138. Id. at 444. 
 139. G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 49 (Dec. 12, 2001) (allows for certain countermeasures to be taken in 
limited circumstances). 
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Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
include detailed provisions on countermeasures.140  The Articles provide 
that countermeasures are allowed “against a State which is responsible for 
an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with 
its obligations.”141  The Articles make clear, however, that the legal regime 
of countermeasures does not in any way modify “the obligation to refrain 
from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations[.]”142  Lawful measures taken in response to a prior wrong include 
non-performance of treaty obligations or the imposition of economic 
sanctions.143  They do not include armed attacks.144 
The United Nations Security Council has also made it clear that armed 
reprisals violate the Charter.145  In Resolution 188 of 1964 the Council 
condemned the United Kingdom’s bombing of Fort Harib in Yemen.146  The 
resolution states that reprisals are “incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations.”147  This point was made again in the 
General Assembly’s 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States.148  Among 
the fundamental rights and duties of states, is the “duty to refrain from acts 
of reprisal involving the use of force” against other states.149  In 2001, the 
General Assembly accepted the International Law Commission’s (ILC) 
Articles on State Responsibility, which include the restriction on 
countermeasures involving the use of force discussed above.150 
The International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations, has also found armed reprisals unlawful.151  In its 1996 
advisory opinion on the Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the 
court said that “armed reprisals in time of peace . . . are considered to be 
unlawful.”152  In the Oil Platforms case, the International Court of Justice 
further held that U.S. attacks on Iranian sites were not lawful acts of self-
 
 140. Id. arts. 49-54. 
 141. Id. art. 51(1)(a). 
 142. Id. art. 53(1)(a). 
 143. Id. art. 51(2); see also Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 7.9, 1995, 
1869 UNTS 14, 21 (allowing the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Body to authorize a 
member state to impose countermeasures when another state is not complying with its trade obligations). 
 144. G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 50. 
 145. S.C. Res. 188, ¶ 1 (Apr. 9, 1964). 
 146. Burton M. Leiser, The Morality of Reprisals, 85 ETHICS 159, 159 n.1 (1975). 
 147. S.C. Res. 188, ¶ 1 (It is noteworthy, and to the United Kingdom’s credit, that it did not veto 
the resolution.). 
 148. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 122 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
 149. Id. 
 150. G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 50. 
 151. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 95, at 
246 (July 8). 
 152. Id. 
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defense because of their retaliatory nature.153  They were not undertaken to 
repel an on-going use of force.154 
Despite the clear positions of the Security Council and General 
Assembly respecting the illegality of reprisals by 1986, Ronald Reagan 
ordered an air attack on Libyan military sites in Tripoli and Benghazi that 
followed ten days after a terrorist bombing of a disco in Berlin.155  Three 
people died in the disco attack; two were American service members.  As 
many as forty people died in the U.S. raids.156  The U.S. said it had evidence 
that Libya planned more acts of terrorism.157   On this basis, U.S. 
government lawyers and scholars presented the argument that the U.S. 
actions, in contrast to Libya’s, were lawful as self-defense under Article 51 
of the Charter.158  In other words, the U.S. attempted to distinguish its 
attacks from unlawful armed reprisals and terrorism.159  The case simply did 
not fit the requirements of self-defense.160  To begin with, the Berlin 
incident did not amount to a significant armed attack per the requirement set 
out in the Nicaragua case.161  Evidence of the necessity for military action 
in self-defense owing to future attacks was also inadequate.162  Whatever 
vague evidence the U.S. had, amounted to criminal plots, not use of armed 
force.163 The UN General Assembly condemned the U.S. attacks.164 
One interesting point for this discussion from the attack on Tripoli is 
that the Reagan administration made a serious attempt to justify its actions 
in terms of the UN Charter.165  During the Cold War, the U.S. was careful to 
restrict legal arguments to the use of force accepted under international 
law.166  Facts were often manipulated, but rarely interpretations of the 
law.167  Such care for preserving the integrity of the Charter noticeably 
 
 153. Iran v. U.S., 2003 ICJ Rep. at 199. 
 154. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 889, 893-894 
(2002). 
 155. 1986: U.S. Launches Air Strikes in Libya, BBC (Apr. 15, 1986),  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/15/newsid_3975000/3975455.stm. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and 
Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 537, 548–49 (1999). 
 158. Id. at 537. 
 159. See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the United States’ Air Operation Against 
Libya, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 933, 933 (1987). 
 160. Id. at 949. 
 161. Lobel, supra note 157, at 541. 
 162. Greenwood, supra note 159, at 947. 
 163. Id. at 954. 
 164. G.A. Res. 41/38, at 2 (Nov. 20, 1986). 
 165. Greenwood, supra note 159, at 949. 
 166. Bruno Simma, NATO, The UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EURO. J. INT’L L. 1, 
3, 4, 17 (1999). 
 167. Byrne, supra note 72, at 98.  The United States and the Soviet Union consistently invoked 
invitation to justify using force in Hungary, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Czechoslovakia, 
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diminished with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of worries that 
the Soviets would adopt the same attenuated justifications.168 
Paying little heed to the actual terms of the Charter or ICJ 
interpretations, President Bill Clinton ordered unlawful armed reprisals on 
several occasions.169  In 1993, he ordered an attack on government buildings 
in Baghdad in response to an alleged plot to assassinate former President 
George H.W. Bush.170  In 1996, when Iraqi troops moved against Kurdish 
separatists in northern Iraq, Clinton ordered attacks in southern Iraq.171  
International law prohibits assassination, and murder of any kind is, of 
course, unlawful.  In U.S. criminal law, the mere planning to carry out such 
an act is criminal, even if no injury results.172  These are crimes however, 
not violations of Article 2(4) that give rise to the right of self-defense under 
Article 51.173  Article 2(4) prohibits military force by states, not every 
violent crime with an international dimension, even one involving sovereign 
states.174  Moreover, the use of force in self-defense to a violation of Article 
2(4) is no longer available days or weeks later in the absence of on-going 
armed attacks.175 
With respect to Clinton’s attacks in support of Kurdish separatists in 
Iraq, the U.S. and UK actually tried to argue that these actions were lawful 
under the UN Security Council Resolutions that had been adopted against 
Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990.176  France and Russia 
disagreed that those resolutions authorized the use of force in response to 
incidents with little connection to Kuwait’s liberation.177  Even if the U.S. 
and UK did have some sort of Security Council authorization to bomb Iraq 
for a dozen years after its withdrawal from Kuwait, bombing southern Iraq 
 
Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Grenada, and Panama.  See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATION LAW AND THE USE 
OF FORCE 182-84 (2018). 
 168. Simma, supra note 166, at 14, 17.  A prime example of the new attitude was the fact the U.S. 
issued no official justification for the first time since 1945 for using military force when it waged the 78-
day bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999 to force the removal of Serb forces from its province of 
Kosovo.  Mary Ellen O’Connell, American Exceptionalism and the International Law of Self-Defense, 
776 SCHOLARLY WORKS 1, 56 (2002). 
 169. John Quigley, Missiles with a Message: The Legality of the United States Raid on Iraq’s 
Intelligence Headquarters, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 241, 242 (1994); Louis Fisher, Military 
Action against Iraq, 28 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 793, 793 (1998). 
 170. Quigley, supra note 169, at 241-42. 
 171. Id.; see also Fisher, supra note 169, at 794. 
 172. 18 U.S. C. § 1117 (1994). 
 173. U.N. Charter arts. 2 ¶ 4, 51. 
 174. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 175. INT’L AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK (David Lee ed., 
5th ed, 2015) 35, 35 n.10, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2015_Ch4.pdf. 
 176. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3245 mtg., at 21–22, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3245 (June 27, 1993). 
 177. Alex J. Bellamy, International Law and the War with Iraq, 4 MELB. J. INT’L L. 497, 508 
(2003). 
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to retaliate for action against the Kurds violated the principles of necessity 
and proportionality.178 
Clinton also carried out unlawful reprisals following terrorist attacks on 
the United States embassies in East Africa.179  On August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda 
operatives detonated two truck bombs targeting United States embassies in 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.180  Over 200 people lost their 
lives because of the bombings, and many more were injured.181  The vast 
majority were Tanzanians and Kenyans.182  A U.S. government committee 
investigating the attacks, found the embassies lacked proper security. 183   
This was a noteworthy finding given that just five years earlier Al Qaeda 
had carried out an attack on the World Trade Center in New York in which 
six people died, and more than a thousand were injured.184  From that 
moment on, the U.S. had plenty of notice of the character and aims of Al 
Qaeda.185  A number of the Trade Center attackers had been arrested and 
convicted.186  The U.S. also succeeded in arresting and prosecuting three 
people linked to the embassy attacks.187 
Rather than enhance security and redouble law enforcement efforts 
against Al Qaeda, measures known to succeed against terrorism, Clinton 
made a fateful decision two weeks after the embassy bombings.188  He 
ordered missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan.189  This was a significant 
step beyond Reagan’s attack on Libya for state-sponsored terrorism and 
 
 178. See Iran v. U.S., 2003 ICJ Rep. 183, 199 (explaining that “necessity and proportionality must 
be observed” to grant a right of self-defense).  Perhaps more problematic is the fact that self-defense can 
only be invoked when force is used against the nation claiming self-defense or in a collective defense 
arrangement.  Id.  The United States was not attacked by Iraq, nor was the United States in a collective 
defense arrangement with the Kurds. Id. 
 179. See Steven Erlanger, After the Attacks: The Diplomacy; Missile Strikes are Seen as New 
Strategy for U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/23/world/after-the-
attacks-the-diplomacy-missile-strikes-are-seen-as-new-strategy-for-us.html; see also In re Terrorist 
Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 180. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d at 180. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Philip Shenon, Many Flaws Blamed in Embassy Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/08/world/many-flaws-blamed-in-embassy-attacks.html. 
 184. Jesse Greenspan, Remembering the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, HISTORY.COM, Feb. 
26, 2013, 
https://www.history.com/news/remembering-the-1993-world-trade-center-bombing. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Richard Bernstein, Explosion at the Twin Towers; 4 Are Convicted in Bombing at the World 
Trade Center that Killed 6, Stunned U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 1994), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/05/nyregion/explosion-twin-towers-4-are-convicted-bombing-world-
trade-center-that-killed-6.html?pagewanted=all. 
 187. 1998 US Embassies in Africa Bombings Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 9, 2017, 11:11 AM), \ 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/06/world/africa/africa-embassy-bombings-fast-facts/index.html. 
 188. Jamie McIntyre, et al., U.S. Missiles Pound Targets in Afghanistan, Sudan, CNN (Aug. 21, 
1998, 5:10 AM), http://www.cnn.com/US/9808/20/us.strikes.02/. 
 189. Id. 
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clearly conflicted with the UN Charter.190  In Afghanistan, the attacks took 
place in Khost, south of the capital Kabul, and in Jalalabad, east of Kabul.191  
The targets included an Al Qaeda base.192  In Sudan, the U.S. declared the 
target to be a “chemical weapons related” facility and that it produced 
chemicals used in the manufacturing of VX nerve gas.193 
Speaking to the nation, Clinton announced that he “ordered our armed 
forces to strike at terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan 
because of the imminent threat they presented to our national security.”194  
He continued: 
I want to speak with you about the objective of this action and why 
it was necessary.  Our target was terror.  Our mission was clear - to 
strike at the network of radical groups affiliated with and funded by 
Osama bin Laden, perhaps the preeminent organizer and financier 
of international terrorism in the world today.195 
“Today,” the president declared, “we have struck back.”196 
Clinton did not directly cite Article 51 nor could he plausibly; the air 
strikes followed terrorist crimes, isolated events that were not part of on-
going, state sponsored use of force in violation of Article 2(4) and triggering 
Article 51.197  Clinton had no firm evidence of any future plans even if the 
truck bombs could amount to the significant armed attack required to trigger 
Article 51.198  Further, the air strikes were on two sovereigns with no legal 
responsibility for the embassy bombings.199  As for necessity, missile strikes 
in retaliation for non-state actor terrorist crimes have no connection to 
 
 190. Shenon, supra note 183. 
 191. McIntyre, supra note 188. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  VX nerve gas, or methylphosphonothioic acid, is similar to sarin gas in that both 
chemicals disrupt the functions of muscles and nerves in the body, leading to death in a relatively short 
amount of time.  Types of Chemical Weapons, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, 
https://fas.org/programs/bio/chemweapons/cwagents.html. (last visited Oct. 3, 2017).  The use of any 
chemical weapons violates the jus ad bello, or laws of war because of their indiscriminate and 
fundamentally inhumane effects.  See generally id. 
 194. President Clinton Strikes Against Terrorist Speech, AP ARCHIVE (Aug. 20, 1998), 
http://www.aparchive.com/search?startd=&endd=&allFilters=&query=president+clinton+strikes+against
+terrorist+speech&advsearchStartDateFilter=&advsearchEndDateFilter=&searchFilterHdSDFormat=All
&searchFilterDigitized=All&searchFiltercolorFormat=All&searchFilteraspectratioFormat=All; see AP 
Archive, USA: President Clinton Strikes Against Terrorist Speech, YOUTUBE (Jul. 23, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EyDJVUSbgR0. 
 195. AP Archive, supra note 194. 
 196. Id.; Barton Gellman & Dana Priest, U.S. Strikes Terrorist-Linked Sites in Afghanistan, 
Factory in Sudan, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/inatl/longterm/eafricabombing/stories/strikes082198.htm. 
 197. U.N. Charter arts. 2 ¶ 4, 51. 
 198. Id. 
 199. McIntyre, supra note 188. 
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successful suppression of terrorism.  The evidence indicates they are 
counter-productive.200  Al Qaeda went on to attack the U.S. on 9/11 as well 
as a dozen other states.201  Al Qaeda was emboldened by the U.S. response, 
treating them as a military organization that could challenge the United 
States at the inter-state level.202 
Curiously, Clinton was also emboldened.203  Many states condemned 
the air strike on Sudan in part because the site bombed was not a chemical 
weapons plant and due to lack of evidence justifying the United States’ 
actions.204  Few states criticized the lack of a legal right to resort to force.205  
So Clinton, embroiled in an impeachment trial over having lied to 
investigators regarding sex with a White House intern, attacked Serbia in 
1999 for seventy-eight days to force the Serbs to pull their forces from the 
province of Kosovo.206  The intervention was under the auspices of NATO 
and clearly violated Article 2(4).207  It was not, however, a reprisal.208  It 
was an act of aggression.209  Serbia actively attempted to defend itself 
resulting in an armed conflict.210  Serbia’s defensive actions were the part of 
attempts to create a legal justification for Kosovo after the fact.211  Sweden 
had a committee look into the legal and factual questions surrounding the 
war, and Canada formed a commission that issued something called the 
“Responsibility to Protect,” a variation on the old concept of “humanitarian 
intervention” to create a new exception to the Article 2(4) prohibition.212  
These ex post facto efforts were in vain.  The rules on resort to force are jus 
cogens, meaning no derogation is permitted.  New exceptions and 
interpretations narrowing the reach of a jus cogens prohibition are forms of 
derogation with no legal validity. 
 
 200. Lobel, supra note 157, at 555. 
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 208. Reprisals, 12 Dig. Int’l L. 148, 149 (1971). 
 209. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 210. See Antonio Cassese, A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio 
Necessitatis, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 791, 793 (1999). 
 211. U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., 7th plen. mtg. at 10-11, U.N. Doc. A/53/PV.7 (Sep. 21, 1998). 
 212. See INTERN’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT 2 (Dec. 2001); see generally Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the 
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In 2000, Al Qaeda struck again, blasting a hole in the side of the U.S.S. 
Cole docked in Aden harbor in Yemen.213  Seventeen U.S. sailors died.214  
This time Clinton did not carry out any major retaliatory strike but 
authorized the CIA to use a newly weaponized Predator drone to hunt for 
Bin Laden and assassinate him and everyone near him with Hellfire 
missiles.215  Clinton interpreted the anti-assassination executive order that 
had restricted such killing since the end of the Vietnam War, as not 
applicable to drone strikes.216  No public evidence is available as to whether 
Clinton had any concern about the international law against assassination 
and the use of military force on the territory of a sovereign state, regardless 
of launch vehicle. 
The CIA did not, of course, succeed in killing bin Laden in 2000.217  He 
went on to order his followers to carry out the 9/11 attacks.218  President 
Bush, in office just eight months, followed Clinton’s lead and authorized 
both a major military operation against Afghanistan and a secret mission to 
kill members of Al Qaeda using drones and other techniques, including a 
car bomb.219  By 2009, these tactics in clear violation of international law, 
had failed to kill bin Laden or slow the pace of terrorist attacks.220  Rather, 
new groups related to Al Qaeda or inspired by it began violent action across 
Africa and Asia.221  Nevertheless, the new administration of Barack Obama 
carried on the war in Afghanistan, doubled drone strikes, and continued at 
varying levels to fight in the civil war in Iraq that had erupted following the 
unlawful invasion by the U.S., UK, and Australia in 2003.222  The Bush 
administration attempted to justify the invasion as Clinton had for the air 
strikes in 1998 in Iraq, by invoking the Security Council’s Resolutions of 
1990–1991.223  Few experts have found this argument credible. 
In 2013, perhaps finally concluding that drone attacks were proving 
counter-productive on many levels in the effort to suppress terrorism, 
 
 213. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF 
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Analysis, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 259, 261 (2012). 
 216. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS, supra note 213, at 132, 132 n.123. 
 217. Death of Osama bin Laden: Fact Facts, CNN (Nov. 4, 2017, 1:12 PM), 
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 223. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4701 mtg., at 2–17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701 (2003); see also Chip 
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Obama’s lawyers developed their own set of “guidelines,” which led to a 
steep decline in attacks.224  At the time the Presidential Policy Guidelines 
(PPG) were developed, commentators pointed out that they did not have the 
force of law and would not bind future presidents.  Acknowledging that the 
law actually forbids targeted killing might have caused Obama and his 
advisers and lawyers to fear the repercussions of admitting to serious law 
violations during his eight years in power. 
Within days of his inauguration, unsurprisingly, Donald Trump 
provided the military with wide latitude to decide where and when to use 
military force, including drones.225  The administration did not mention the 
UN Charter rules on the use of force in issuing its policy.226  No mention 
was made of Obama’s PPG.227  On January 25, 2017, President Trump was 
joined for dinner at the White House by Secretary of Defense James Mattis 
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford.228  No legal 
advisers were present.229  President Trump gave his first approval for a 
specific military operation: a combined air and ground attack on a village in 
Yemen.230 
The operation went forward during the moonless early morning hours of 
January 29 (January 28 in the U.S.); thirty U.S. Navy Seals, together with 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) troops and some troops loyal to ousted 
Yemeni President Hadi, employed drones launching Hellfire missiles, 
helicopter gunships, Harrier jets, grenades, and small arms.231  The village 
of Ghaylil, in the remote Bayda province, was the target.  Men of the village 
had been fighting on the same side as the U.S., in favor of the Saudi-backed 
President Hadi.232  The village was fortified and the men kept guard from 
attack by Houthis, who are backing Hadi’s predecessor, President Saleh, 
who was supported by Iran.  According to The Intercept, the residents had 
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no idea why the Americans and Emiratis attacked them and did so without 
compunction.233 
Women, ten children under the age of thirteen, and fourteen Yemeni 
men died.234  A U.S. Navy Seal was killed and several more U.S. troops 
were wounded.  The UAE will not say if they lost anyone.  A $78 million 
Osprey aircraft was intentionally destroyed to prevent it from falling into 
opponents’ hands.  Nevertheless, President Trump’s spokesperson Sean 
Spicer declared the operation “highly successful.”235  He shifted to linking 
the operation to the Obama administration when the details came out of the 
dozens killed, including among the children, an eight-year old American 
girl.236  A video seized in the raid and meant to demonstrate its success was 
ten years old. 
The U.S. followed this tragedy with yet more air strikes in Yemen.237  
President Trump proclaimed areas “zone[s] of active hostilities,” where the 
military will not need any prior White House authorization to strike.238  The 
president went on to loosen the Obama administration’s zero civilian 
casualty policy in counter-insurgency operations, like those in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Syria.239  Soon after the policy change, well over 100 civilians 
died in a U.S. airstrike on an apartment building in Mosul, Iraq on St. 
Patrick’s Day.240  Then on April 6, Trump ordered the attack on Syria.241  
“[O]n Tuesday,” the president began, “Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad 
launched a horrible chemical weapons attack on innocent civilians.”242  
“Using a deadly nerve agent,” he continued, “Assad choked out the lives of 
helpless men, women, and children.”243  “It was a slow and brutal death” 
caused by Sarin gas, that targeted “[e]ven beautiful babies.”244  The moral 
outrage of the president peaked when he said that “[n]o child of God should 
ever suffer such horror.”245 
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German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel said President Trump’s 
missile strike was “understandable.”246  Explaining Germany’s frustration, 
Gabriel said that 
It was almost unbearable to see that the U.N. Security Council was 
not able to react clearly and unambiguously to the barbaric use of 
chemical weapons against innocent people in Syria . . . .  It’s 
understandable that the United States have now reacted with an 
attack against the military structures of the Assad regime which 
caused this atrocious war crime.247 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Fancois Holland 
then issued a joint press release and declared that “President Assad bears 
sole responsibility for this development. His repeated use of chemical 
weapons and his crimes against his own people demanded sanctions, as 
called for by France and Germany as early as summer 2013 following the 
massacre in Ghouta.”248  The United Kingdom and Australia described the 
United States reprisal as “appropriate” and “just.”249 
CONCLUSION 
Lack of international condemnation, however, is not a license for the 
use of force nor is moral outrage.250  Moral outrage at the Syrian 
government is justified.  The use of chemical weapons is always wrong. It is 
little wonder that President Trump’s missile strikes were popular.251  The 
world looks at Syria with horror as the inhuman violations of human rights 
continue.252  We want something to be done; we want Assad and the other 
perpetrators to be brought to justice.253  It is equally wrong, however, to 
transform our sense of injustice into vengeance.  Frustration over another  
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https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/EN/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2017/2017-04-07-erklaerung-
merkel-hollande_en.html. 
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use of chemical weapons in Syria cannot justify the violation of a jus cogens 
norm.  Since the end of the Cold War, concern for the rule of law continues 
to fade under the pressure of moral arguments and demands for greater 
security.  Yet, as explained above, the prohibition on the use of force is an 
ancient and universal moral prohibition as well as legal one.254 
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was right to rebuke China for 
subverting the global order and undermining the sovereignty of its 
neighbors.255  He pointed to India as a model.256  Would that he could point 
to the United States as a model of compliance with the rules that matter 
most—the restrictions on killing with military force.257 
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